There can't be many moral standards with more intuitive appeal than the Pareto principle.
4

I. Introducing the Pareto Principle
The Pareto standard arose out of nineteenth and early twentieth century debates about utilitarianism. When economists abandoned the idea of interpersonal comparisons of utility, they were left with a normative puzzle. Pareto provided the solution, as Bob Cooter explains:
If utilities cannot be summed, can economists say anything about public policy? This is the problem to which Pareto found a solution that proved far more successful than he could have hoped.. A Paretian analysis, as proposed by its inventor and greatly refined by generations of economic theorists, first assumes that there is an initial distribution of resources, which is given outside the model. Once the initial distribution is described, the analysis proceeds to ask whether any reallocation of resources can make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. If the answer is "Yes," the reallocation is a Pareto improvement. If the answer is "No," the initial allocation is Pareto efficient (also called Pareto optimal"). Starting with an allocation that is inefficient, Pareto efficiency is achieved by reallocating resources until the opportunities for Pareto improvements are exhausted. 5 We can rephrase the Pareto principle as a comparison of states of the world. If at least one person prefers State A to State B, and no one has the opposite preference, then society should adopt State A rather than State B.
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(One could think of the motion to adopt State A as passing by 7 Amartya Sen, On Ethics & Economics 32 (1987) . Sen goes on to say that "Pareto optimality can, like 'Caesar's spirit,' 'come hot from hell.'" Id. 8 Id. at 35. True, the Pareto principle is not everything. Pareto optimality is, according to Amartya Sen, "a very limited kind of success": "[a] state can be Pareto optimal with some people in extreme misery and others rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off without cutting into the luxury of the rich." 7 Still, Sen says, though there many unappealing states of the world are Pareto optimal, "it has been thought reasonable to suppose that the very best state must be at least Pareto optimal." 8 So Pareto optimality seems to be at least a necessary condition of the best outcome, though far from being a sufficient condition.
The Pareto principle is especially significant because its logic turns out to be far more powerful than its modest formulation may suggest. Given some additional but fairly modest 6 assumptions about continuity and about the form of utility functions, it turns out that the Pareto principle implies that social decisions can be made only by combining individual utility functions, eliminating any independent weight for concepts such as fairness. Thus, it is a very short step from Pareto to full-blown welfarism.
Although the details of the proof are clever and sophisticated, the basic idea is simple.
The heart of the proof is follows. If some non-welfare factor really matters, then at least it must be able to break ties between two states of the world that have equal welfare. If we assume continuity, then the state of the world with the greater degree of fairness should still be favored when two states of the world are very close but not tied in terms of welfare. This means that we can end up favoring a state where welfare is lower, and it turns out that we can find such a state that is actually Pareto inferior. 9 We could avoid this result by dropping the assumption of continuity. But dropping this assumption essentially presumes that the non-welfare value is trumped by an infinitely small loss of welfare. So we can keep the non-welfare factor but only by giving it virtually no weight at all. Thus, modest and intuitively appealing as it may be, the Pareto principle potentially has far-reaching consequences.
The Pareto principle is generally considered to be the "gold standard" for policy analysis.
When a change in legal rules produces a Pareto improvement, the argument is over -or so it is thought. While much dispute exists about Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 10 and about the relevance of distributional norms to law and economics, 11 the Pareto principle is often taken by practitioners 12 See Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 313 (1995)(Pareto efficiency as minimal criteria for defining social optimality); Mark Seidenfeld, Microeconomic Predicates of Law and Economics 54 (1996)((economists are "enamored" of Pareto principle). 13 Trebilcock, supra note 10 at 822 (emphasis in original). For every wasteful law, a more efficient one could be substituted and the savings could be distributed among the people affected by the change so that some are made better off without making anyone worse off. Waste is, consequently, an irrationality to expunge from law and policy. 13 Who can possibly be in favor of wasting resources? Isn't the Pareto principle one of those rare moral precepts -a self-evident truth? Alas, its self-evidence is most apparent as a distance, but begins to disintegrate when we examine it closely.
II. Preferences versus Welfare
Recall the homely example used in the previous section. If Mary wants to see Movie #1 rather than Movie #2, and Bob either agrees with her or doesn't care, then the couple surely should go see Movie #1, which makes her happier and at worst makes no difference to him. And yet, on reflection, it is not so clear that the couple "should" see the first movie. Maybe Mary is wrong: the second movie will give her more pleasure or expand her horizons. Or maybe she only wants to go to the first movie because it will allow her to feel superior to Bob. That might not be a good thing. Or maybe they should talk over the decision, as a result of which they might discover that it would be better for them as a couple (rather than as two individuals) to go to the other movie. In our movie example, these are fairly trivial concerns -after all, it was a trivial hypothetical -but in other settings, similar concerns may raise important moral questions.
Part of the appeal of the Pareto principle is found in a common paraphrase: society should take an action "if one person is better off, and no one else is hurt." But the principle itself is actually stated in terms of preferences and not in terms of welfare. There is a reason for this: preferences are presumably objective social facts, but determining a person's true welfare involves a normative judgment that most economists would prefer not to make. 9 that she should do so, as we will see. She might try to satisfy his preferences in order to make him feel happier or to make his life better (which might of course not be the same thing). But the linkage between preferences and either happiness or welfare is contingent.
It might seem obvious that satisfying preferences makes people happier, but this is not always true. In reality, satisfying people's preference might or might not make them happier.
For example, studies by psychologists show that "the very wealthy do not have a substantially more favorable perception of the quality of their lives than do the middle classes." 14 In contrast, education "produces a greater sense of well-being than wealth equal to the education's price."
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In short, while most people have a preference for increased wealth, satisfying this preference may not in fact be a good way of making them happier. It is even less clear that great wealth would necessarily advance their "well-being" in any meaningful sense.
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"While being happy is a momentous achievement," according to Sen, "it is not the only achievement that matters to one's well-being." 17 Or, as Judge Posner puts it, "Happiness is important to most people, but it isn't everything. How many of us would be willing to take a pill that would put us into a blissfully happy dreamlike trance for the rest of our lives, even if we were absolutely convinced of the safety and efficacy of the pill and the trance?" Suppose there were an "experience machine" that could give people the highest quality experiences possible. These high-quality experiences might be intense sensations of pleasure or they might be experiences of climbing Everest or composing a symphony.
Let them be whatever experiences mental-state theorists of well-being claim are ultimately and intrinsically good. The mental-state theorist would then have to say that all people would be better off permanently hooked up to a reliable experience machine rather than living their own lives and experiencing the decidedly mixed mental states that come with them. If one believes that those who are hooked up to the experience machine are missing out on some of the intrinsically good things in life . . . then one cannot accept a mental-state view of well-being. 19 The distinction between happiness and well-being is a classic issue regarding utilitarianism. Completely decisive philosophical arguments do not exist but the argument against defining utility as a mental state seems to come close. Yet Whatever may be the merits of these or other efforts to define individual welfare objectively, we certainly cannot assume that what people want on any given occasion will actually promote their objective welfare. Thus, if we want to maintain a defense of the Pareto principle in terms of people being "better off," we must define the relevant preferences counterfactually, as the preferences people would have had if they understood their true welfare.
B. Preferences and Social Welfare
Apart from questioning the linkage between preferences and individual welfare, we might also question whether individual preferences invariably translate into some measure of social well-being. There are three problems here: (a) satisfying some kinds of antisocial preferences might not contribute to a better society, (b) we may not be able to aggregate individual preferences in a straightforward way, and (c) we may think that society's decision making process should give people the opportunity to deliberate collectively over their preferences rather than simply taken those as given. We discuss these problems in turn.
As to the first problem, it has often been suggested that some preferences, such as those based on racism or sadism, do not deserve to be counted in making societal decisions. 
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A constitutional democracy with a meaningful bill of rights places limits on the range of preferences that the state will recognize. For example, even if every citizen of Smallville is an evangelical Protestant who favors Bible reading the public school, such Bible reading is forbidden by the federal constitution. . . .
By its nature, a bill of rights removes some kinds of preferences from society's consideration, while it raises others to a privileged level. 23 The idea of laundering preferences is also endorsed by Adler, one of the leading law school advocates of welfarism.
24
In contrast to Hovenkamp, Kaplow and Shavell argue that all preferences are equally entitled to respect. We should not, therefore, discard preferences such as racism or sadism in calculating social welfare:
To trump preferences is, in essence, to redefine individual's well-being in a manner that substitutes some other preferences -ones that are cleansed, so to speak -for individuals' actual preferences . . . But such an approach is troubling from the perspective of welfare economics because the moral force and appeal of welfare economics lies in promoting the actual well-being of people, not in advancing some hypothetical notion of satisfaction that is distinct from that of the individuals who are the objects of our concern.
Furthermore, employing a cleansed version of preferences, rather than actual preferences The trouble with the Kaplow and Shavell argument on this point, as we will see later, is that the Pareto principle is only weakly linked with autonomy. One might instead argue on the basis of liberal tolerance that society should count all preferences equally, even intolerant ones.
But this requires a very strong form of tolerance. It is one thing to argue against social intervention to change or frustrate anti-social tastes. It is another to argue that society has a collective interest in actually advancing those tastes (at least when doing so does not harm other individuals) --for example, that if people like telling racist jokes and society considers such jokes harmless, a liberal society should actively try to promote opportunities for racists to tell these jokes to each other. (And if we assume continuity, that means that society should continue to promote those jokes even when they do some degree of harm to others.) Such an argument would not be impossible to make but it is clear that we are far from the sort of self-evidence that the Pareto principle originally seemed to promise.
Another problem with using the Pareto principle for making societal decisions also deserves mention. There is a technical difficulty involved in applying the Pareto principle under conditions of uncertainty. It is quite possible that people are unanimous in their preferences over choices, but have varying views about the outcomes and probabilities involved. Simply aggregating the preferences may be misleading. 27 For example, consider the question of whether to adopt a policy requiring all welfare recipients to work. Liberals might support the policy because they believe that it will prevent cuts in benefits levels, which they oppose.
Conservatives might support the policy because they believe it will lead to benefit cuts, which they favor. So there is unanimous support for the proposal. But this does not mean that adoption of the proposal will lead to a state of the world preferred by everyone over the status quo. In fact, it is logically impossible for both liberals and conservatives to be satisfied, since either benefits levels will go down or they will not.
Presumably, the solution to this problem is to apply the Pareto principle only to preferences about outcomes, as opposed to preferences about decisions. The decision-maker then applies her own best estimate of probabilities to determine whether a particular decision would be Pareto preferred if the participants shared his best estimate of the outcomes.
Alternatively, the decision-maker could pool the probability estimates of the individuals involved. But separating the probabilities and the preferences creates difficulties of its own.
Regardless of whether the decision-maker uses pooling or an independent assessment of probabilities, the probability figure she derives will not generally correspond to those of the affected individuals. It is even possible that she would find a policy to be Pareto optimal although it is universally opposed, because she determines that using the correct probabilities, everyone would prefer the expected outcome of the proposed action over the status quo. To the extent that attachment to the Pareto principle rests on a belief in individual autonomy, the decision-maker is on questionable ground here. This objection to rejecting individuals' probability estimates disappears if our basis for adopting the Pareto principle is individual welfare rather than autonomy. But the welfare analysis becomes much more difficult than the Pareto principle seems to promise, for we can no longer simply base the societal decision on actual individual rankings. Applying his own estimate of probability (or a pooled probability) to the outcome preferences of the individuals requires that the decision-maker have very good information about those preferences. Rather than simply knowing that individuals choose action A or action B, the decision maker must be able to attach cardinal utilities to the two outcomes in order to calculate expected utility. As a practical matter, this may make application of the Pareto principle quite difficult.
A final difficulty in moving from individual preferences to social decisions is that we might not want to take those preferences as pre-political "givens." Communitarians believe that 30 Id. at 443. 31 Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 51. 32 Hausman & McPherson, supra note 19, at 79. 33 Posner, supra note , at 12. Posner views preference stability as a methodological commitment, adopted to make prediction more feasible, but this does not eliminate the normative problems raised by the Pareto principle when in fact preferences are contingent.
16 express in her role as a citizen. 29 The distinction is said to be that choices involve moral commitments and beliefs rather than merely wants and desires.
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III. Contingent Preferences
Preferences may depend on circumstances. "That some nontrivial part of people's preferences is a product of their environment, rather than logically prior to all experience, seems so obvious that it is not worth debating." 
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Before the fact, the parties to a contract make think it will make them better off, but one or both of them may be wrong. As Trebilcock points out, from an ex ante perspective, this later regret is irrelevant, assuming the earlier decision was fully informed, rational, and voluntary. But from an ex post perspective, performance of the contract is no longer Pareto optimal. Trebilock calls this the "Paretian dilemma." 34 Economists strongly favor the ex ante perspective, which in effect resolves the dilemma in favor of the earlier preferences of the parties. 35 Others would favor the use of ex post preferences. Indeed, they say, "the very point" of laws may be to "cultivate and elevate preferences." 36 Although the ex ante perspective is not untenable, the normative case for it is far from straightforward.
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Even where preferences have not changed, the ex ante perspective is not so obviously the correct moral vantage point.
For example, suppose that two lawyers are trying to settle a case. They both prefer the settlement to the risk of waiting for the jury to come back with a verdict. Thus, ex ante, enforcing the settlement seems Pareto optimal, since it is preferred by both to the alternative of non-settlement. Unbeknownst to either of them, the jury has already come back to the courtroom with a verdict. When she learns this, the lawyer for the winning party prefers to nullify the settlement. So ex post, the settlement is not Pareto optimal. It is not clear that her original consent to the settlement should be morally binding, or that the ex ante perspective on this transaction is more valid than the ex post perspective. It is true that she consented to the transaction, but only under a mistake of fact. (Of course, we might say that morally she assumed the risk, but this seems rather circular -it assumes that she should have known she would be morally bound even if the jury had already returned -and in addition there is no reason to think that either party was consciously aware of this particular risk.) We may enforce such a contract, but that is on the grounds of social utility rather than any a priori argument for applying the Pareto principle ex ante.
To sharpen the issue, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine a society of sadists.
The Torture Show, a television program, kidnaps randomly selected individuals and tortures them to death on camera. (In some ways, this is only an exaggeration of the basic idea of some actual "reality TV" shows, where individuals are humiliated for the entertainment of others!)
Assume that the odds of being a victim are so small that ex ante, everyone would prefer to have the show than not to have it. Ex post, however, the victims' preferences regarding continuation of the program are reversed -after all, they are sadists rather than being insanely masochistic.
(But note that the victim's underlying goals have not changed --he is still a sadist and still happy to watch other people being tortured.) Does the Pareto principle require that the show continue?
One argument against the show is that sadistic preferences do not count; thus, even ex ante we give no weight to the pleasure anyone might derive from watching and only count the expected cost of being a victim. We will consider that argument later, but for the moment let us put it aside. Is it clear that the ex ante perspective is appropriate here?
The essential claim behind the ex ante perspective is that the victims would have accepted the gamble in advance so that it is fair to hold them to it now. But there are two possible arguments to the contrary, neither of which can be dismissed out of hand. The first counterargument is that, although the victims would have consented to taking the risk of becoming victims, they did not actually do so. Even in the unlikely event that we have perfect information about their preferences, their hypothetical consent may not carry the same moral force as actual consent. To say that a person can be subjected to pain and death because he actually agreed to it is one thing; to say that he could be so treated because he would have agreed seems much weaker. The second counter-argument is that even actual consent might not be enough. Perhaps it is not morally permissible to torture people to death for fun even if they have consented. This second argument takes the idea of inalienable rights seriously --people have a non-alienable right to be free from this kind of conduct, which they retain even if they attempt to bargain it away.
If we endorse the Pareto principle, adopt the ex ante perspective, and refuse to launder away tastes like sadism, then we are committed to endorsing The Torture Show. Part of the power of this example is that the preferences involved are so distasteful, suggesting preference laundering as a solution to the problem rather than abandoning the ex ante perspective. But there are also scenarios with less distasteful preferences where the same problem arises.
For instance, assume that the death penalty is a highly effective way to deter crime (a controversial assumption). It has always been in effect in the jurisdiction. For any citizen who is not actually being executed at any given time, the crime control advantages outweigh the risk of being executed in the future. John Doe, an innocent person, is now on death row. Must we say that Doe has no reason to complain of being executed, because in the past he would have endorsed the death penalty if anyone had thought to ask him? It seems difficult to give this much weight to a counterfactual act of consent. Even if he had consented, consent to a risk might not automatically translate into consent to a harm. If capital punishment is adopted for reasons of social policy, some risk of executing an innocent man is inevitable, but this seemingly makes such an execution morally excusable, not morally desirable. (One might be tempted to say that Doe has benefitted from the existence of the death penalty in the past, but this might not be factually true -quite likely he personally would not have been a murder victim even without the death penalty.) Are we committed to calling the death penalty Pareto optimal by disregarding an innocent person's current objection to being executed? And are we sure that even actual consent to be wrongfully executed would be enough to justify the execution? 
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From the standpoint of his present values, which he cannot shake off or suspend, his past actions may seem pointless or evil; in this respect, he is likely to regard his earlier decisions as a foreign element whose continuing influence appears senseless from the standpoint of his present goals.
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For example, addictions and habits reflect preferences which are themselves generated by past behavior. In this situation, Kaplow and Shavell argue that we should accept the ex post preferences of the individual as more accurate gauges of welfare. Thus, "if it is discovered that individuals are able to adapt to certain physical disabilities more or less readily than is commonly supposed, the valuations employed in measuring tort damages or in performing cost-benefit analysis (for example, of highway safety improvements) should reflect actual harm rather than the victim's uninformed ex ante estimates."
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This example seems dubious. If a person was afraid of being maimed but later found that the pain killers made him happier than ever, we would still be reluctant to call his being maimed a Pareto improvement.
Another example, which may be more favorable to the Kaplow and Shavell view, may be presented by the issue of surrogacy contracts. When a woman enters into a contract to bear a child for another couple, it may seem like a very favorable arrangement. But after giving birth, she might unexpectedly find herself with a much different attitude toward giving up the child.
She might even feel that, having gone through the experience of childbirth, she is now a different person than she was when she entered into the contract. A rule enforcing the surrogacy contract is Pareto optimal based on ex ante preferences but not on the basis of ex post preferences.
In such situations, the Pareto principle becomes indeterminate unless we simply resolve the situation by fiat, as Kaplow and Shavell themselves do. On paternalistic grounds, perhaps their solution might have something to say for it, but it is difficult to support on autonomy or consent-based grounds -essentially it involves exposing people to risks that they would not voluntarily undertake because we think we know better than they do how they will feel afterwards. This is a strategy parents frequently adopt with small children (with mixed success).
It is less clear that such a strategy should be adopted by society toward its members. In any event, this interpretation of the Pareto principle moves us far away from autonomy values toward paternalistic supervision of individual welfare.
B. Before and After the Legal Rule
A particular problem arises when the legal rules themselves affect preferences. 40 Then the policymaker must decide beforehand which set of preferences to favor, a decision that obviously cannot be made by looking at those preferences themselves. 41 For instance, cognitive psychologists have established a recurring pattern in human behavior: people will demand more to sell something than they would be willing to pay to buy it.
For example, in one experiment, students who were randomly given a candy bar instead of a coffee mug were unwilling to trade for the mug, but those randomly receiving the mug were equally unwilling to trade for the candy bar. This "endowment" effect is strongest when people feel some moral entitlement to what they possess, even if the grounds for such a feeling are slim. 42 In this situation, the Pareto standard is completely indeterminate. If people happen to have coffee mugs initially, they universally prefer the mugs to the candy bars. Hence, it appears that possessing mugs is Pareto superior to possessing candy bars. If they happen to start off with candy bars, however, we find the opposite results. In particularly, if we are in the position of assigning legal entitlements to mugs versus candy bars, we cannot apply the Pareto principle because the preferences depend on how we assign the entitlements.
Again, this is less of a difficulty if we take a paternalistic view of Pareto than an autonomy-based one. From the paternalistic view, we need merely decide which situation makes people happier or better off -how they rank alternatives themselves or which they would choose has no relevance except as evidence of what is really good for them. Of course, the paternalistic Paretian is left with the considerable problem of determining on people's behalf what is really good for them.
Another instance of shifting preferences arises when adoption of a legal rule causes a conceptual shift in how people regard the relevant transaction. One concern is that legalizing certain market transactions will have harmful effects on how people view themselves and each other. The Pareto principle is strongly linked with the idea of market transactions. Assuming fully informed, rational, and uncoerced decisions, an agreement to exchange two commodities must be a Pareto improvement -no one would agree to such an exchange unless it satisfied their 43 See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987). 44 Trebilcock, supra note 10 , at 26. 45 Id. at 35. 46 Id. at 50.
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preferences at least as well as the status quo. But society has always had doubts about certain exchanges, such as the sale of sexual services, infants for adoption, and body organs. One objection is that we should not transform sexual activities, children, or body parts into commodities. Instead, we should view these things as integral to our definition of our selves, and thus incapable of being property.
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A specific fear is that "permitting transactions such as these, along with the market rhetoric and manifestations that accompany them, may change and pervert the terms of discourse in which members of the community engage with one another." 44 For example, "[o]ne concern with respect to legal sanctioning of inter vivos organ sales is that people will begin to view their organs entirely as commodities." 45 Similarly, critics of surrogacy contracts fear that such contracts will reinforce oppressive gender roles. 46 Rather than being worried that a new legal rule will change preferences, we might welcome this result if we believe that current preferences are distorted. One long-standing concern about basing social policy on existing preferences is that those preferences may be warped by existing oppressive institutions. As Sen says:
A person who has had a life of misfortune, with very little opportunities, and rather little hope, may be more easily reconciled to deprivations than others reared in more fortunate and affluent circumstances. . . . The hopeless beggar, the precarious landless labourer, the dominated housewife, the hardened unemployed or the over-exhausted coolie may all 47 Sen, Ethics and Economics, supra note 9, at 46. These errors make it harder to connect the proposition "individuals prefer A to B" to the proposition "society should choose A over B."
A. Cognitive Limitations
Sometimes people's preferences are disarranged because of their inability to process information. We cannot necessarily say as a result that any given preference is wrong. Rather, we must say that preferences are out of alignment with each other -for example, that preferences for specific outcomes when their achievement is a certainty are out of whack with preferences for various probabilistic packages of outcomes. Given such inconsistencies, we cannot take 52 See Sunstein, Introduction, in Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economicss, supra note 42, at 4-5. 53 See Korobkin and Ulen, supra note 51, at 1078. 54 Id. at 1086-1090.
27
preferences as given but must make adjustments. This necessarily involves a certain degree of paternalism, further undermining the autonomy argument for the Pareto principle.
Thanks to the efforts of cognitive psychologists, we now know a good deal about human intellectual limitations. For example, we know that humans make systematic errors in estimating risks. They tend to be overly optimistic, thinking they are less subject to risks than the average person. On the other hand, they overestimate risks based on the amount attention given to the risks by the media. When an event has happened, they also overestimate the prior probability of its occurrence. Thus, people's decisions under uncertainty may reflect mis-perceptions of probabilities rather than true preferences about outcomes.
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Preferences may also be disarranged because preferences over specific attributes do not match preferences over complicated packages of attributes. When faced with complex tasks, people take shortcuts. For example, rather than trying to find the optimal outcome, they "satisfice" by settling for the first acceptable option rather than continue to search.
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Even when given correct probability information, people mis-process the information, ignoring information about base rates and focusing instead on the representativeness of an outcome. 54 These cognitive deficits clearly make practical application of the Pareto principle more difficult. We can no longer take completely for granted that voluntary, fully informed exchanges meet the Pareto principle. What is less clear is whether irrationality causes any normative difficulties for the Paretian. The effect of these cognitive difficulties is to take the analyst farther 55 See id. at 1120. 56 See id. at 1122.
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way from what people actually prefer regarding certain choices, and toward what people would prefer if their thinking met the economist's conception of rationality. Whether this is normatively troublesome depends on our degree of toleration for paternalism. In any event, we are once again pushed away from autonomy and preferences toward paternalism and objective welfare as the basis for applying and justifying the Pareto principle.
B. Incomplete or Incoherent Preferences
Reliance on preferences can also be problematic when people have incomplete or incoherent preferences. This leaves the Pareto principle impotent to the extent we are really serious in phrasing it in terms of "preferences." To the extent that "preference" is really just
shorthand for "what people would really prefer if they knew what was truly good for them," we can continue to endorse the Pareto principle, though only as a minimalist form of utilitarianism.
We can begin by considering situations in which people have seemingly inconsistent preferences. For example, they frequently use a different discount rates for different time periods, resulting in preference reversals due to the mere passage of time.
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This leads to situation where it is rational to make a plan, which it will then be rational to break despite the absence of any relevant change in preferences or circumstances. Similarly, people often demand more for accepting a delay than they would be willing to pay to accelerate the same event. Other inconsistencies seem to show that preferences in some sense do not exist until people have reason to construct them, and that the results of the construction depend on the context. For example, the choices people make in pricing risky alternatives are not always consistent with their rankings of the alternatives.
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The general conclusion is that preferences are constructed not found:
The discussion of the meaning of preference and the status of value may be illuminated by the well-known exchange among three baseball umpires. "I call them as I see them," said the first. "I call them as they are," claimed the second. The third disagreed, "They ain't nothing till I call them." Analogously, we can describe three 
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Economists assume that preferences always exist between any two outcomes, so that a person can readily make a choice. But a number of philosophers insist on the incommensurability of values and our inability to give them all a common metric.
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If we support the Pareto principle because we truly care about fulfilling people's preferences, this gives us a real problem: people may not have any ascertainable preferences at a given time. If instead, we are using Pareto as a stand-in for utilitarianism, we face some very difficult measurement problems. Essentially, in the instances where people find themselves stymied in making decisions for their own lives because of the difficulty of comparing radically different values, we must be prepared to make the comparison for them if we are to apply something like the Pareto principle.
We must also be willing to decide the "correct" way to frame specific choices, because what people prefer is often a function of how choices are presented. Framing effects are one of the best established findings in cognitive psychological. Choices depend not only on what options are present but on how those options are presented. For example, people will see a penalty for using credit cards differently from a bonus for using cash, and will respond differently to the two. 60 Yet, the economic substance of the two is exactly identical. Frames can lead to inconsistent attitudes toward risk aversion, and can be affected by fairly small changes in presentation. 
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How are we to specify the "correct" setting for a decision, the one that will reveal what people "really" prefer? It is difficult to see any alternative except picking the frame that is most likely to lead people to the right choice, the choice that really furthers their welfare or happiness.
So the framing problem reinforces our growing suspicion that the Pareto principle is really just a minimalist version of utilitarianism.
V. Preferences, Rights, and Social Choice
Even if preferences are perfectly connected with individual welfare and perfectly stable, some questions remain about the Pareto principle. As we will see, accepting Pareto may force us to abandon other desirable aspects of a decision-making process. Quite apart from Sen's technical result, one must question the degree of the connection between the Pareto principle and the idea of personal autonomy. The Pareto principle does not merely mean that people are entitled to make choices. It also says that it is perfectly legitimate for society to make choices for them, if society believes that the affected individuals will like the results and no one else will be harmed. The ultimate grounding of the Pareto principle is not autonomy but paternalism. As a practical matter, the best paternalistic strategy may be to let people make their own decisions because they have better incentives or information about their own preferences. But this is a purely contingent result; the Pareto principle does not preclude the possibility that no individual would ever be allowed to make a decision about his own life become some super-computer was better than they were at figuring out how to maximize their preferences. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sen was actually able to prove a logical inconsistency between Pareto and libertarianism.
A. Autonomy and Pareto
In a recent book, Kaplow and Shavell extend Sen's result to argue that Pareto is inconsistent with any non-welfarist moral values such as fairness. They contend that "individuals will be made worse off overall whenever consideration of fairness leads to the choice of a regime different from that which would be adopted under welfare economics because, by definition, the two approaches conflict when a regime with greater overall well-being is rejected on grounds of fairness." 67 In particular, when people are symmetrically situated ex ante --for example, equally 68 Id. at 52 (emphasis in original).. 69 Id. 70 Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 9. 34 likely to cause accidents or be accident victims --Kaplow and Shavell say that it is "always the case that everyone will be worse off when a nation of fairness leads to the choice of a different legal rule from that chosen under welfare economics." 68 Their explanation is simply that:
Because everyone is identically situated, whenever welfare economics leads to the choice of one rule over another, it must be that everyone is better off under the preferred rule.
Hence, whenever a notion of fairness leads one to choose a different rule from that favored under welfare economics, everyone is necessarily worse off as a result.
69
These are controversial arguments, but to the extent that they are accepted, they can as easily be used to raise questions about the Pareto principle as about fairness or other moral norms. One intuition is that a situation is better if everyone prefers it. Another intuition is that a situation is worse if it violates human rights. If they are inconsistent, which should prevail? To 
B. Pareto and Social Choice
If we are designing an institution for making societal decisions (i.e., a government), should we insist that the institution's decisions be consistent with the Pareto principle? This may seem desirable, but it could in practice conflict with other desirable characteristics of social decision making.
As a matter of common sense, there seem to be a number of obvious attributes that any system for making social decisions should have. One of them is the Pareto principle. Another is that choices should be transitive: if society prefers A to B and B to C, then it should also prefer A to C. Still another is that the decision should not be affected by the presence of irrelevant alternatives: eliminating the least favored alternative from the agenda should not affect the ultimate choice between the other, more favored alternatives. (Recall the effect of the strawberry ice cream on the choice between chocolate and vanilla.) Alas, Arrow's Theorem is only one of a host of proofs that no mechanisms of social choice can satisfy some such set of obvious basic requirements. 71 Thus, we must sacrifice some desirable aspect of decision-making or another.
The only question is which one.
In some situations, it may well be the Pareto principle that should be sacrificed. For example, majority voting systems are potentially subject to chaotic cycling, which could make the legal regime dangerously unstable. In order to attain stability, it may be useful to introduce some friction into the system, so that laws can only be passed if they make fairly large changes that possess wide popular support. But this friction may block changes that would help some small group of people without harming anyone else. Such a sacrifice of the Pareto principle may be worthwhile in systemic terms.
waste sounds like a good idea, but like all good ideas, it may have diminishing returns. It may simply not be worth the trouble of searching out every possible Pareto improvement; we might do better to settle for an outcome that seems reasonably close to Pareto optimality. We might also bend the Pareto principle to ensure that outcomes have other desirable qualities. For example, in designing mechanisms for dividing goods among individuals, it may be impossible to find one where the results are guaranteed to be Pareto efficient and also leave each individual equally satisfied. 72 We -or the individuals involved -might care more about equity than or to the preservation of great works of art. Thus, the Pareto principles means that if everyone else is indifferent and one person has a faint distaste for Rembrandt, it is better for society to destroy all of the Rembrandts in the world. This is far from being an intuitively compelling conclusion.
One might reasonably think that the world would be poorer if the last redwood or the last Rembrandt were destroyed, even if everyone alive were too insensitive to care.
Thus, in at least some circumstances, we might be willing to allow modest incursions on the Pareto principle, thereby tolerating a certain amount of economic inefficiency, because we would like the decision-making process to have other desirable attributes. An ideal system for making decisions would incorporate all of the features we desire, but unfortunately no such system is possible. The Pareto principle does not seem uniquely entitled to a sacrosanct status if such tradeoffs must be made.
VI. Conclusion
In the course of working on this essay, I found myself driven to three conclusions. The Paretian limits himself to the easiest cases for applying utilitarianism, those where the only utility changes are positive. This eliminates the problem of measuring utility, although we may still be perplexed about whether to consider the satisfaction of certain tastes as genuinely improving individual well-being. But although it avoids some of the practical problems of full-blown utilitarianism, it raises many of the same ethical issues.
Indeed, as we have seen, it takes only the addition of a continuity assumption to change the Paretian into a utilitarian (or a close cousin). As with utilitarianism, we can hope that the Pareto standard will ordinarily lead us to results favoring human liberty, equality, and other values. But there is no guarantee that this will always be so, and in case of conflict, we must be prepared to sacrifice human dignity and the like for greater social utility. Whether this seems problematic depends partly on how often we expect such conflicts to arise, and partly on whether we are willing to abandon our other moral intuitions.
Third, although I am no longer willing to accept the Pareto principle as a self-evident truth, I continue to think that it is often a useful standard. But several conditions have to be met for us to be willing to apply the Pareto principle with any confidence:
1.
To the extent that preferences are distorted by cognitive deficiencies or other factors, we have to be sufficiently sure of our ground to be comfortable with making paternalistic corrections.
2.
Preference satisfaction cannot conflict with another goal (if any) we hold dearly, such as autonomy, individual rights, or cultural and environmental values.
3.
Preferences must be relatively stable, unaffected either by the transaction or the legal environment.
4.
Making Pareto optimality an absolute requirement must not require undue sacrifice of other desirable aspects of decision making such as stability or efficiency.
Most people will find that these conditions are satisfied at least some of the time, many will find them satisfied often, and a few will find them satisfied always. Thus, the Pareto principle is likely to remain a useful tool. But we should not imagine that Professor Pareto showed us the way to normative bedrock.
